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19651

The Supreme Court and Labor Law:
An Analysis of Recent Trends and
Developments
William B. Gould*
T IS ALMOST FIFTY YEARS now since Mr. Justice Holmes'
dictum to Harold Laski characterized American trade unions
as private dubs or their equivalent. And more than thirty years
have elapsed since the Norris-LaGuardia Act committed us, ever so
briefly, to a laissez-faire type Olympian detachment towards labormanagement relations. Those concepts have long since been demolished by both legislators and judges; this is nowhere more dearly
displayed than in the Supreme
Court's treatment of the ever
THE AUTHOR (B.A., University of
increasing volume of labor law
Rhode Island, LL.B., Cornell, Graduate
cases which clamor for adjudiStudy, London School of Economics),
cation. Last summer the Court
former Assistant General Counsel, International Union, UAW, AFL-CIO, is an

attorney with the National Labor Relations Board and member of the Michigan
Bar.

adjourned its October 1963
Term in the midst of wide-

spread comment on several
landmark decisions in the civil
liberties field. The very fascinating evolution of new labor law
dwelt in comparative obscurity.1
I.

SECTION

301

AND PREEMPTION

In the October 1963 Term, the Court continued the task of fashioning principles to govern the labor contract, the instrument which
often arises out of an established labor-management relationship and
where, incidentally, the Holmesian comment contains its most obvious anachronisms. This judicial process began in 1957 when the
Court held, in Textile Workers v.Lincoln Mills, that collective bar* The viewpoints expressed by the author are his own and do not necessarily represent
those of the National Labor Relations Board or any of its members.
1. Further analysis by this writer of recent decisions by both the Supreme Court and
the National Labor Relations Board can be found in Labour and the Law, The Economist (London), Oct. 10, 1964, p. 153.
2. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Lincoln Mills held labor contracts enforceable pursuant to
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations,
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gaining agreements are enforceable under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act in federal court, as well as state court,
and that federal law would govern that action. The latter element
was accurately summarized by the dissenting opinion "as yet
[with]in the bosom of the judiciary."' And subsequently the Court
wisely deferred to arbitration whenever possible,4 thus blunting the
sharp edge of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's unkind belief that the judiciary was unsuited for the venture at hand.5
A.

Impact of the Business Merger

(1) Survival of ContractRights.-In John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
v. Livingston,6 Mr. Justice Harlan speaking for a unanimous Court,'
set forth an example of how the public policy in favor of peaceful resolution of labor disputes through arbitration will override the interpretation that courts ordinarily place upon contracts
between private parties. In Wiley it was held that "the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically
terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agreement, and
that, in appropriate circumstances, present here, the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the agree8
ment."
The major result here will be to place the Court's imprimatur
upon the notion that rights derived from a labor contract can survive its expiration; that the presence of a new employer, change of
geographical location, and the lack of an existing agreement may
not serve, "in appropriate circumstances," to deprive such rights of
their "vested" characteristics. The Court was, however, careful to
articulate the limited nature of its holding, though inevitably the
more specific limitations could not be so successfully delineated. For
instance, Mr. Justice Harlan states that "this case cannot readily be
may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 5 185 (1958). [hereinafter cited
as LM.R.A.]
3. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 465 (1957).
4. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
5. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 464 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
6. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
7. Mr. Justice Goldberg did not participate in this case.
8. John Wiley & Son, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964).
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assimilated to the category of those in which there is no contract whatever, or none which is reasonably related to the party sought to be
obligated." 9 The operative language then is a reasonable relationship. What are the circumstances and factors which a judge must
ascertain? Clearly, as the Court notes in Wiley, the "wholesale
transfer" of employees to the new plant is important. So also is the
"substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise before
and after a change ... ."10 All of this, the Court indicates, will serve
to negate such factors as the disproportionate sizes of the respective
operations, a factor which may raise havoc when, as in Wiley, the
successor is considerably larger. On the other hand, it is clear that
the union may "abandon" or waive its rights if it does not raise its
claims in a timely fashion. But what of the case in which the union
raises its claims, with what in retrospect becomes embarrassing
vigor? The facts in Wiley - persistently unsuccessful union attempts to convince Wiley's predecessor of its position - point up
the irrelevance of any "bargaining away concept."'"
The importance of Wiley does not lie solely in successor corporation problems. For the first time the Court made it dear that the
substantive question of arbitrability of a particular subject matter as distinct from the determination of the merits of the question is for the courts and not the arbitrator. "The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory submission to arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that the collective bargaining
agreement does in fact create such a duty."' 2 This proposition was
not as free from argument as Wiley pretends to make it. In United
Steelworkers v. Warrior& Gulf Nay. Co.,"3 the Court warned of the
9. Id. at 550. (Emphasis added.)
10. Id. at 551.
11. Ibid.
12. Id. at 547.
13. 363 U.S. 574 (1960). Justice Harlan in Wiley quotes Mr. Justice Douglas from
Warrior:
The Congress .. . has by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
assigned the courts the duty of determining whether the reluctant party has
breached his promise to arbitrate. For arbitration is a matter of contract and
a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has
not agreed so to submit. Yet, to be consistent with congressional policy in
favor of settlement of disputes by the parties through the machinery of arbitration, the judicial inquiry under § 301 must be strictly confined to the
question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or
did agree to give the arbitrator power to make the award he made. An order
to arbitrate the partioular grievance should not be denied unless it may be
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of
an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts sould be resolved
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dangers flowing from judicial meddling where matters were best
reserved for the expertise of an arbitrator. A crucial point there and one that is apparently missed in Wiley - was that the judiciary
had a terrible weakness for confusing the arbitrability question with
the merits of the disputes. In Warrior, the Court's preference
seemed to be a transferral of all questions to an arbitrator when, in
the first instance, a quantum of evidence would signify that the case
could be properly before that tribunal. Prior to Wiley, however,
one could only speculate about the extent to which the courts might
delve into the arbitrability question. The Court had never been
explicit. But now Wiley tells us that there had been "no doubt"
about this matter; moreover, it produces a somewhat surprising result.14
Two other points require mention in connection with the Wiley
case. One is that case's holding that labor disputes "cannot be
broken down so easily" into "substantive" and "procedural" aspects
and that, therefore, questions concerning literal compliance with the
grievance procedure must be heard by the arbitrator along with other
more identifiably substantive matters.' 5 The holding is sound, as
in favor of coverage. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363
U.S. 574, 583 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
The Court also held:
In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from
arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude
the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here, the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad. (Tihe court
should view with suspicion an attempt to persuade it to become entangled in
the construction of substantive provisions of a labor agreement, even through
the back door of interpreting the arbitrationclause, when the alternative is
to utilize the services of an arbitrator. Id. at 584. (Emphasis added.)
In light of the above, it seems that th Warrior holding, while acknowledging the
consensual basis of arbitration, does not give the investigation into the parties' intent
the full substantive question of arbitrability - to the judiciary. Theirs is the more
modest role of ordering the parties to submit to the arbitrator's jurisdiction except in
the case of contrary "positive assurance" or "the most forceful evidence," probably in
the form of a written exclusion clause. This is a limited function and one that cannot
be said to resemble a determination of the entire substantive question. In a sense, it is
similar to the Court's holding in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236 (1959), wherein it was held that the NLRB has primary jurisdiction of cases
"arguably" the subject matter of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board must
then decide whether (1) to assert jurisdiction; and (2) the activity is protected or prohibited under the Act. Id. at 245. According to Warrior it would seem that the
arbitrator must also decide two similar questions.
14. John Wiley & Son, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546 (1964); in addition to
Warrior, the Court cites Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962).
This would be persuasive were it not for the fact that Atkinson involved a different
question, a union's attempt to stay an employer damage suit on the theory that the suit
should have been properly submitted to arbitration.
15. John Wiley & Son, Inc. v. Livingston, supra note 14, at 556.
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the Court says, in terms of both logic and policy. But it is curiously
inconsistent with the broad holding that arbitrability in toto, to read
the Court's opinion, is for the judges.
The second point concerns the necessary import that this case
must have for the National Labor Relations Board and its interpretation of an employer's duty to bargain with a union. 6 The Court
in Wiley was at pains to state no "view on the questions surrounding a certified union's claim to continued representative status following a change in ownership."' 7 In the cases before the Board, the
union will seek to lay a foundation for future contracts rather than
extract from that which has already been agreed upon. The former's source is a statutory right; the latter's is contractual. Despite
such differences, it is possible that the criteria utilized in Wiley may
be relevant to Board cases and that the latter may be similarly helpful to the courts in section 301 cases. The Board's elaboration of
national labor law in duty to bargain cases may not be limited to
that provision alone. As the Board said in Maintenance, Inc.:
The duty of an employer who has taken over an "employing industry" to honor the employees' choice of bargaining agent is not
one that derives from a private contract, nor is it one that necessarily turns upon the acquisition of assets or assumption of other
obligations usually incident to a sale, lease, or other arrangement
between employers. It is a public obligation arising by operation
of the Act The critical question is not whether Respondent succeeded to White Castle's [the employer] corporate identity or
physical assets, but whether Respondent continued essentially the
same operation, with substantially the same employee unit whose
duly certified bargaining representative was entitled to statutory
18
recognition ....
There is a remarkable similarity here. The Board does not reach
the dilution of employee unit apparent in the Wiley merger (recognition means majority status); the Court, in future cases, may well
require evidence of a commercial transaction as a reasonable relationship. But there is a convergence of relevant criteria.
(2)
Duty to Bargain on Decision to Subcontract.-Finally,
dictum in Wiley hints at the resolution of issues recently ruled
on by the Court with regard to an employer's duty to bargain
16. See L.M.R.A. § 8(a) (5), 61 Stat. 140-41 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5)
(1958) : "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section
9(a)." Section 9(a) provides for recognition of representatives who obtain a majority
vote in an appropriate unit.
17. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964); cf. Retail
Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962).
18. 57 LR.R.M. 1129, 1130 (NLRB 1964); cf. Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. No.
111 (1965).
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about the managerial decision to subcontract. 9 However, the hint
is somewhat Delphic: "The objectives of national labor policy, reflected in established principles of federal law, require that the rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be balanced by
some protection to the employees to a sudden change in the employment relationship."2
Do "rightful prerogative" and "independently" mean that the Board cannot require an employer to bargain about such decisions? Or is the duty to bargain to be distinguished from substantive regulation of such prerogatives and thus be
viewed as a duty to follow procedure? 21 Is the prerogative itself to
be balanced, or does the balancing consist of "some protection to
employees" in the aftermath?
The Court, albeit ever so cautiously, has indicated in Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB,22 that employee protection is to some
extent provided in the face of this kind of managerial rearrangement. Chief Justice Warren, writing the majority opinion, emphasized that the duty to bargain as postulated was limited to the facts
in that case, and that the contracting out concerned "work previously performed by the members of an existing bargaining unit" and
that rather than an issue involving capital investment, that the Court
was simply confronted with an employer "which replaced existing
employees with those of an independent contractor to do the same
work under similar conditions of employment."'
Although criticized by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart as a holding
which "radiates implications of ... disturbing breadth .". . ."" the
Court is quite careful to speak softly: "Our decision need not and
does not encompass other forms of 'contracting out' or 'subcontracting' which arise daily in our complex economy."2 5
19. East Bay Union of Machinists v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert.
granted, 375 U.S. 963 (1964).
20. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964).
21. Ct. International Union, UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir.
1962), wherein the Seventh Circuit held that the union shop clause in the contract impliedly prohibited management's substantive right to subcontract maintenance work
done on plant premises.
22. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
23. Id. at 213.
24. Id. at 218. Justices Douglas and Harlan joined in Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion. Their viewpoints are accurately summarized by Justice Stewart's statement
that "I do not believe that an employer's subcontracting practices are, as a general
matter, in themselves conditions of employment...
On the facts of this case, I join
the Court's judgment, because all that is involved is the substitution of one group of
workers for another to perform the same task in the same plant under the ultimate
control of the same employer." Id. at 224.
25. Id. at 215.
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The Board has begun to articulate the limitations to be imposed
on Fibreboard. The duty to bargain does not arise where there is
an express "waiver" as evidenced by contractual language, 26 or the
bargaining history of the parties.27 A contractual prohibition of
subcontracting to employers who pay substandard benefits implies a
managerial prerogative in all other realms of such activity.2 8 If the
employees do not suffer adverse economic consequences, the employer need not bargain.2 9 The various relevant factors are set forth
by the Board in Westinghouse Elec. Corp.:
[B]earing in mind particularly that the recurrent contracting out
of work here in question was motivated solely by economic considerations; that it comported with the traditional methods by
which the Respondent conducted its business operations; that it
did not during the period here in question vary significantly in
kind or degree from what had been customary under past: -estab-

lished practice; that it had no demonstrable adverse impact on em-

ployees in the unit, and that the Union had the opportunity to*
bargain about changes in.
existing subcontracting practices at general negotiating meetings . for all these reasons cumulatively,
we conclude that Respondent did not violate its statutory bargain-

ing obligation by failing to invite union participation in individual

subcontracting decisions.30

In New York Mirror,1 the Board has relied upon Fibreboardin
dealing with an employer's duty to bargain about a plant closure or
elimination of the entire unit: "The elimination of unit work is no
less within that statutory phrase when it is to result from a management decision affecting an entire operation. And this is so even
though the likelihood is slim that prior consultation with the union
26. International Shoe Co., 59 L.R.R.M. 1176 (NLRB-1965); Ador Corp., 58
L.R.R.M. 1280 (NLRB 1965); General Motors Corp., Buick-Oldsmobile-Pontiac Assembly Div., 57 L.R.R.M. 1277 (NLRB 1964). See also Quarterly Report on Case
Developments, Office of the General Counsel, Feb. 1, 1965, at 7-9.
27, Cf. Cities Service Oil Co., Case No. 6-CA-3014, Trial Examiner's Decision, Nov.
5, 1964; Allied Chem. Corp., 151 N.LR.B. No. 76 (1965). But see Adams Dairy,
137 N.LR.B. 815 (1962), modified, 332 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963), remanded, 379
U.S. 644 (1965).
28. Shell Oil Co., 57 LR.R.M. 1277 (NLRB 1964).
29. American Oil Co., 58 L-R.R.M. 1412 (NLRB 1965); Fafnir Bearing Co., 58
LR.R.M. 1397 (NLRB 1965); American Oil Co., Case No. 14-CA-3125, Trial Examiner's Decision, Feb. 8, 1965; Allied Chem. Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1965); General Tube Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (1965); Central Soya Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 161
(1965).
30. 58 LR.R.M. 1257 (NLRB 1965). Compare Superior Coach Corp., 58 LR.R.M.
1369 (NLRB 1965) and Georgia-Pac. Corp., 58 LR.R.M. 1135 (NLRB 1965), with
Jersey Farms Milk Serv. Inc., 57 LR.R.M. 1166 (NLRB 1964). See also the Board's
definition of good faith bargaining in Shell Oil Co., 57 L.R.R.M. 1279 (NLRB 1964).
31. 151 N.LR.B. No. 110 (1965); cf. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 148 N.L.R.B.
No. 59 (1964); see generally the cases cited in New York Mirror, supra.
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will alter the employer's contemplated decision."3 But grave doubt
now hovers over that dictum in light of the Supreme Court's holding
in NLRB v. Darlington Mfg. Co.33 In Darlington,the Court ruled
that a single businessman's decision to cease operations was beyond
the purview of sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) of the act even
when the conduct is motivated by antiunion considerations. How
then can the employer violate the duty to bargain under section
8(a) (5) - which is derivative from 8(a) (1) - in light of
Darlington? Presumably the Board will be called upon to explain
this shortly.
(3) Individual Rights.-Another business merger was responsible for the questions presented last term in Humphrey v. Moore. 4
Here a union member (1) challenged the right of an employerunion committee to "dovetail" the seniority lists of two plants, both
represented by the same union, under a labor contract, and (2)
claimed that the committee's decision was obtained by dishonest union conduct in breach of its "duty of fair representation." The Court,
citing previous cases in point, " held that such a duty was cognizable
in federal courts as a result of the "broad authority" given to the
unions as "exclusive bargaining agent in the negotiation and administration" of the contract. Because of both factors - alleged violation of the contract and breach of the duty of fair representation
- the Court held that the action was one arising under section 301.
Here, once again, the proclamation of a new doctrine was almost
deceptively glossed over.
In so deciding, the Court relied upon its decision in Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n." Smith had contributed mightily to the confusion about individual rights under section 301. This may have
been attributable to the Court's very necessary and responsible preoccupation with the demolition of Association of Westinghouse Salaried Empllyees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,3" a case which said
that the union could not bring section 301 actions to obtain "indi32. New York Mirror, 151 N.L.R.B. No. 110, at 8 (1965).
33. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
34. 375 U.S. 335 (1964); see Comment, Federal Protection of Individual Rights
under Labor Contracts, 73 YALE L.J. 1215 (1964).
35. Id. at 342. In this regard the Court cites Syres v. Local 23, Oil Workers Int'l
Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953);
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steel v. Louisville & N.R.
Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
36. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
37. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
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vidual" rights - that is to say those rights which inured in a peculiarly direct manner to the employees themselves. The suit in
Westinghouse was to recover wages. In Smith, a union member
sued individually and on behalf of forty-nine other workers similarly
situated for wages lost as a result of an illegal employer violation of
the no-discrimination clause protecting union members against discrimination because of such membership. The Court disposed of
Westinghouse as "no longer authoritative as a precedent." Furthermore, the Court said that
[the] rights of individual employees concerning rates of pay and
conditions of employment are a major focus of the negotiation
and administration of collective bargaining contracts. Individual
claims, at the heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery,
are to a large degree inevitably intertwined with union interests
and many times precipitate grave question concerning the interpretation and enforceability of the collective bargaining contract
on which they are based. 38
The Humphrey case then is the Court's first opportunity to articulate just how seriously the quotation above was intended. It is
clear that even where union and employee interests are "intertwined" to the extent of a clash between the two, jurisdiction is to
be asserted. The idea propounded in Smith and relied upon in
Humphrey - that a subversion of the uniform federal labor policy
will develop if suits by individuals can be brought in state and not
federal court - is a sound one. It remains valid despite the persuasive dissent of Mr. Justice Black in Smith3" which points up the individual right, intact despite the enactment of the National Labor
Relations Act, to bring suit subject to normal jurisdictional requirements. It is anomalous to permit the form in which a suit is brought
by individual or union - to govern the forum, the law, and perhaps the outcome of cases which may involve identical circumstances. Moreover, it might be said that Humphrey simply fills in
the unstated premise contained in Smith - the likely probability
that the union itself would, under normal circumstances, bring suit,
thus fulfilling its basic functions rather than assume a posture of
inactivity which strongly hints at union-employee antagonisms.
Yet the very argument advanced so successfully in Humphrey
can redound against the position just advanced. For, as Mr. Justice
Goldberg stated in his concurring opinion in Humphrey, the proper
scope of the duty of fair representation and that which the collective
38.
39.

Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962).
Id. at 201.

(Emphasis added.)
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bargaining agreement covers can be varying ones. The union and
employer might well take action the source of which is entirely independent of the contract. In the absence of the clause in question in
Humphrey, they might take action or even amend the contract so
that their interpretation would be clearly correct. Yet this would
not necessarily alter the union's duty of fair representation. A contract requiring the relegation of Negroes to janitorial classifications
might be complied with, though it would undoubtedly be unenforceable in court on grounds of public policy. But can anyone now
doubt that a union which negotiated such a clause would be anything
but derelict in its duty as bargaining agent on behalf of all employees?4" It is possible that many clauses would afford the union
much scope in administration. Is the shop steward who passes over
the claims of one employee because the two of them have a family
dispute exculpated from the duty to represent fairly because the contract is not offended? Such potential inconsistencies argue, much
more than those envisaged by the Smith and Humphrey majorities,
for the allocation of the duty of fair representation cases to the
NLRB or some other expert agency, with contract actions (individual or union versus company) remaining in the hands of the
courts under section 301."' Mr. Justice Goldberg correctly stated
that "just as under the Huffman decision an amendment is not
to be tested by whether it is within the existing contract, so a grievance settlement should not be tested by whether the court could
agree with the parties interpretation. If collective bargaining is to
remain a flexible process, the power to amend by agreement and
the power to interpret by agreement must be coequal."42
40. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964). There is also the possibility
that the National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction in this area. See Local 1 & 2,
Independent Metal Workers Union, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (NLRB 1964); Local 138, Int'l
Union of Operating Engineers, 57 L.R.R.M. 1009 (NLRB 1964); Miranda Fuel Co.,
140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
41. This of course should not detract from the racial discrimination cases brought in
federal court independent of § 301. Cf. Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192
(1964). While there is an equal danger of conflict in many forums here, the cost and
harassment involved in lengthy court proceedings will usually compel Negro workers
to seek a remedy with the National Labor Relations Board or the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 705, 78 Stat.
258, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-4 (Supp. VI, 1965). Discussion of the latter is beyond the
scope of this article, as is the nonracial Miranda-type fair representation cases. However, for an analysis of the remedies afforded victims of employment discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see Note, Employment Discriminalion: State FEP Laws and the Impact of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 16
W. REs. L. REV. 608 (1965).
42. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 355 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring opinion); see note 24 supra. Mr. Justice Douglas stated the following: "I agree for the
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Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring and dissenting in Humphrey;
would have invited the NLRB to "present its views by brief and
oral argument" on the question of whether the Court's decision in
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,4 3 which grants the
Board primary jurisdiction under the doctrine of preemption whenever the subject matter in litigation is "arguably" within the scope
of sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA, precluded both federal and state
court jurisdiction. Of course Smith involved activity - and herein
lies much of the above mentioned confusion - which was dearly,
not arguably, within the scope of sections 7 and 8."' This is unchanged by whether the union or the employee initiates the action.
Yet the Court in Smith seems to stumble, much to the irritation of
Mr. Justice Black, in articulating the question at hand.45 However,
the above stated policy considerations might prove to be a more convincing argument for Board jurisdiction. On the other hand, one
is indined to mute such wish-fulfillment when reflecting upon another section 301 decision handed down in the 1963 Term.
B.

Jurisdiction:Federal, State and Arbitration

(1)
The Court's Leanings to Arbitral Jurisdiction.-InCarey
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,4 6 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, permitted the public policy behind arbitration to override some strong considerations in favor of exclusive jurisdiction of
the NLRB - a principle which the Garmon case once seemed to
promulgate.4 7 In Carey, the union and employer had entered into
a collective bargaining agreement which recognized the union as exclusive bargaining representative for those units in which it was certified by the NLRB. The agreement listed among those units certified a unit consisting of "all production and maintenance employees"
but excluded salaried technical employees. Also contained in the
reasons stated by my Brother Goldberg that this litigation was properly brought in the
state court but on the merits I believe that no cause of action has been made for'the reasons stated by the Court." Id. at 351.
43. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
44. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - [to interfere with, restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in § 7;] by discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization .... " L.M.R.A. §§ 7,
8(a) (1),(3), 61 Stat. 140-41 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §5 157, 158(a) (1),(3) (1958).
45. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 201, 202 n.2 (1962).
46. 375 U.S. 261 (1964). Mr. Justice Goldberg did not participate in this case.
47. The very broad rules of both Garmon and Warrior articulated without mutual

qualification, were inevitably bound to collide. The penchant for a multiplicity of tribunals rather than judicial action is, of course, the prime reason for the confusion.
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agreement was a grievance procedure culminating in arbitration in
the case of unresolved disputes involving the "interpretation, application or claimed violation" of the contract.
The union filed a grievance claiming that certain employees in
the engineering laboratory, who happened to be represented by another union certified as the bargaining representative for "salaried
technical" employees, were performing work of a production and
maintenance type. The company refused to arbitrate on the ground
that the matter was properly within the jurisdiction of the NLRB as
part of a representation proceeding.4 8
The Court noted the existence of a "jurisdictional" dispute which
could conceivably arise as a work dispute problem - the dispute
being prohibited by the NLRA' 9- - or "a controversy as to which
union should represent the employees doing a particular work" a representation proceeding. The Court said that if it were the
former, arbitration might well "put into movement forces that would
48.

See L.M.R.A. § 9(c) (1), 61 Star. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 159 (c) (1) (1958):

Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Board - (A) by an employee or group of
employees or any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees (i) wish to be represented for
collective bargaining and that their employer declines to recognize their representative ... or (ii) assert that the individual or labor organization, which
has been certified or is being currently recognized by their employer as the
bargaining representative . . . (B) the Board shall investigate such petition
and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due
notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or employee of the regional office who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto.
If the Board finds upon the record of such a hearing that such a question of
representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify
the results thereto.
See also LM.R.A. § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958), which
provides that a majority of employees are to choose representatives "in a unit appropriate for collective bargaining."
49. See L.M.R.A. § 8(b) (4), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. S 158
(b) (4) (D) (Supp. V, 1964) :
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents (4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed
by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to
engage in a strike, or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where in either case an object thereof is - . .. forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in . . . a particular
trade, craft, or class . . . unless such employer is failing to conform to an
order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative
for employees performing such work ....
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resolve the dispute"; but at the same time it conceded that only one
union would necessarily be party to the arbitration.
The Court then proceeded to discuss the various eventualities under the alternate assumption that the case actually involved a representation matter; it is here that the opinion begins to go astray. It
was correctly noted that in this case the union might file a refusal to
bargain charge, or a motion to clarify the certification. Assuming
that the union is certified, the latter would be the more probable under
the facts as set forth in Carey. Here, however, Mr. Justice Douglas takes what might be called three steps in -one stride. First, the
opinion seems to assume that motion to clarify, if granted, would
require the Board to issue a remedial order in an unfair labor practice case. But this is decidedly not so. However, the Court is conveniently able in this manner to escape the snares of conflict posed
by the two equally available forums of representation and arbitration proceedings. Moreover, Mr. Justice Douglas advances the Smith
holding to its outermost limits. The Court cites Smith for the proposition that "an unfair labor practice does not bar individual employees from seeking damages for a breach of a collective bargaining agreement.. . ."'0 Unlike the Court's willingness in Smith to
treat future cases on an ad hoc basis, there are now to be no more
qualifications. Without discussion, the Court alters Smith, at least
for Carey purposes, and applies the same broad rules to representation cases. Three steps in one. It is a dizzying pace!
The Carey opinion's real defect, however, is its benevolent complacency regarding the Board's ability to iron out the conflicts which
even the Court admits are bound to occur. The Court assures that
the Board's ruling will "take precedence" over that of the arbitrator.
Thus, "the possibility of conflict is no barrier to resort to a tribunal
other than the Board . . . fand] resort to arbitration may have a
pervasive, curative effect even though one union is not a party....
The superior authority of the Board may be invoked at any time.
Meanwhile the therapy of arbitration is brought to bear in a complicated and troubled area."'" This writer respectfully suggests that
one who offers up a slight murmur of skepticism to such comforting assurances of order may rightfully expect to wind up on surer,
safer, and indeed more practical grounds of reasoning. For, as Mr.
Justice Black stated in dissent: "[The Court's recently announced
leanings to treat arbitration as an almost sure and certain solvent of
50.
51.

Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 268 (1964).
Id. at 272.
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all labor troubles has been carried so far in this case as unnecessarily
to bring about great confusion ..... 5' Just one example of the confusion predicted by Justice Black and, indeed, the great harm that
can be done to workers and employers will suffice. Suppose that
a union is negligent in representing employees in a plant and thus,
as it must, dissatisfaction sets in. Suppose further that the union
had not been collecting dues under its union security agreement, but
that upon hearing of a rival union movement it decides to become
activist in at least this sense. The workers cannot petition the Board
for a new representation election because, as the regional director informs them, the present contract is a bar to such a proceeding."
Their lawyer informs them that the support for their movement is
not great enough to assume the contract under a "defunctness"
theory,54 or for that matter under any other legal vehicle.55 Meanwhile, they are surprised to receive papers indicating that the incumbent union has filed a petition in a state court to compel arbitration on the question of whether they must be discharged for failing
to pay their dues, despite a request, under the union security clause.
The court, over the pleas of the workers who say that they are filing
a petition with the Board for de-authorization of the union shop, 56
citing Carey, comments that all will end happily anyway and orders
arbitration. The arbitrator, whose authority is limited to the privately negotiated contract, agrees with the union's contention that
the contract has been violated and that the workers should properly
be discharged. The workers involved might well be enmeshed in
an awkward and, for them, unfortunate situation, especially if the
Board decides not to permit them to vote in the de-authorization
52.

Id. at 276 (dissenting opinion).

53. Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1001 (1962); Deluxe Metal
Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958).
54. Defunctness of a union disqualifies its contract as a bar to an election. It must
appear that the union is not willing and able to represent the employees. The Board
finds defunctness where, at a publicized meeting with a high proportion of membership
in attendance, an overwhelming percentage is in favor of dissolution and disaffiliation
from the incumbent union. A resolution should have been signed and no rival unions
should attempt to dominate the meeting. Subsequently, grievances should be processed
under the name of the rival union. See Gulf Oil Corp., 137 N.L.R.B. 544 (1962);
Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1441 (1961); Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121
N.L.R.B. 901, 908 (1958); Waterway Terminals Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1788 (1958);
Arthur C. Harvey Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 338 (1954); Benjamin Air Rifle Co., 107
N.L.R.B. 104 (1953); American Factors Ltd., 104 N.L.R.B. 199 (1953).
55. See Consolidated Brick Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 914 (1960) (assignment of contract
to new union).
56.

See L.M.R.A. § 9(e) (1), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.

§

159(e) (1)

(1958).
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proceeding5 7 (which would mock the Board's processes) and not to
disturb their discharge in deference to arbitration."a Even assuming
that the Board dearly perceives what is happening and decides one
of these questions affirmatively, which will according to the Court
"take precedence," there are still problems. These disgruntled employees may get little satisfaction from the privilege of voting in a
Board election if their jobs are now lost. Suppose that the union
is successful in enforcing its award in court. Has the Court now
scuttled the near blank check drawn for such awards a few years
ago?59 Or does the absence of the rival union from the arbitration
hearing, a factor that did not seem to bother the Court much in
Carey, alter the decision? If either question can be answered affirmatively, surely lawyers are entitled to know rather than risk the jobs,
wages, and profits of innocent parties in endless litigation. In a
sense Carey has undone more than it has settled.
(2) New Dimensions of State Jurisdiction.-In contrast to
Carey, the Court when confronted with the competing claim of
state rather than arbitral jurisdiction, encouraged a broad interpretation of'Garmon, which harked back to the Garner' and Weber 6
cases, in Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton.'2 In Morton, the
question was whether an Ohio state court could apply state law in
awarding damages resulting from peaceful strike conduct vis-4-vis a
secondary employer, or whether it was confined to damages resulting from the "specifically limited provisions of section 303 of the
Federal Act," which provides for damage suits ,in federal and state
courts arising out of unlawful secondary boycotts. The contention
was that the total strike activity could be regulated by the states
when part was unlawful (under state but not federal law) and,
more precisely, that the subject matter inquestion was neither "arguably" protected nor prohibited and that consequently the states had
a free hand. With Mr. Justice Stewart writing for a unanimous
57. See the cases cited in Carey note 46 supra.
58. The Board in International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), aff'd sub.
nom., Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1964), which involved similar enforcement of a union security agreement, has been hospitable to arbitration awards.
But see Lummus Co., 142 N.LR.B., 517 (1963); cf. Raley's Inc., 143 N.LR.B. 256
(1963); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.RB. 1080 (1955).
59. Cf. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
60. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
61. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1954). Both Garnerand Weber
are discussed in Gould, The Garmon Case: Decline and Threshold of Litigating Elucidation, 39 U. DET. LJ.539 (1962).
62. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
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bench, the Court made it dear that Garmon is not to be restrictively
applied, and that the lugubrious no man's land which contains
neither protected nor prohibited territory is tightly barred to state
interference:
If the Ohio law of sendary boycott can be applied to proscribe
the same type of conduct which Congress focused upon but did
not proscribe when it enacted § 303, the inevitable result would
be to frustrate the congressional determination to leave this
weapon of self-help available, and to upset the balance of power
between labor and management expressed in our national labor
policy."

The Garmon case had clearly overruled the Court's decision in International Union, U.A. W.A. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd. (Briggs-Stratton)," which allowed the courts to decide on the
merits what was for the Board and what was for the states. Procedurally, Garmon gave the Board first crack. But now the Morton
decision obliterates the substantive foundations of Briggs-Stratton:
the idea that the states can handle conduct falling into the murky
terrain which is neither section 7 nor 8.65
A similar attitude was reflected in Liner v. Jafco, Inc."6 In
that case a North Carolina building contractor was engaged by
Jafco, a general contractor, to erect a shopping center in Cleveland,
Tennessee. The building contractor operated an "open shop" and
the workers were paid lower than union scale wages. The Hod
Carriers Union, pursuant to authority obtained from its Building
Trades Council, placed one picket at the site in protest. The picket
sign stated that the building contract was "not under contract with
Chattanooga Building Trades Council, AF of L." As a result of
the picketing, work promptly ceased. Jafco then sought and obtained in a state court an ex parte injunction against such conduct.
Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, held that the injunction must be set aside as it was aimed at what was arguably a
"labor dispute." Determination of such a case's merits is thus
allocated to the Board.
63. Id. at 259-60; Mr. Justice Goldberg concurred separately and stated the following:
"'My concurrence in the Court's opinion and judgment does not indicate approval of
the Court's holding in UA W V. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, and United Const. Workers v.
Laburnam Corp., 347 U.S. 656." Id. at 262. As both cases held state jurisdiction
valid in cases involving violence, those issues may be reopened. But see San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
64. International Union, U.A.W.A. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336
U.S. 245 (1949).
65. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), wherein
the Court hinted that the rule might be as broad as Morton now states.
66. 375 U.S. 301 (1964).
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(3)
Section 14(b) and Union Security.-Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n v. Schermerhorn7 was an important preemption decision
which involved a contract issue in a state court. The action did
not fall under section 301 and its federal law as would normally
be the case in a state court action," but was rather a suit for declaratory judgment stating that a negotiated agency shop clause violated
Florida's right-to-work law. Section 301 could not be at issue as
Congress in section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartey Act delegated the
power to enact union-security legislation, more restrictive than the
union shop permitted by federal law, to the states.6 9 The Court, in
the previous term, had held that Florida had the authority under
section 14(b) to prohibit the agency shop along with other types
of union security agreements!' But the Court was troubled with the
question of whether state courts were the proper tribunals to enforce such prohibitions rather than the NLRB.
In the 1963 Term, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous
Court,7 held that the state courts can enforce the prohibitions
against these clauses enacted by their legislatures but that "state
power, recognized by § 14(b), begins only with actual negotiation
and execution of the type of agreement described by Si 14(b)." 2 One
cannot quarrel with the soundness of a decision which permits the
states to enforce that which they properly legislate, rather than to
invite conflict by awarding the former authority to the Board. Justice Douglas is also correct in stating that the broad language used
in Garmon could not be applied to subject matter specifically relegated to the states by Congress.
Of course the Court is candid enough to say that "as a result of
Section 14(b), there will arise a wide variety of situations presenting problems of the accommodation of state and federal jurisdiction
in the union security field."7 One such problem arises out of the
Court's allocation of state jurisdiction to the negotiation of unlaw67. 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
68. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
69. L.M.R.A. S 14(b), 61 Star. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 5 164(b) (1958): "Nothing
in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of
agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State
or Territorial law."
70. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 757 (1963).
71. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963). Mr. Justice
Goldberg did not participate in this case.
72. Id. at 105.
73. Ibid.
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ful clauses, while at the same time noting its adherence to its previous decision which placed picketing "to get an employer to execute
an agreement to hire all-union labor in violation of a state union
security statute... exclusively in the federal domain .... ."" These
two rulings would appear to disadvantage the union which frames
its demands peacefully, albeit for objectives that are illegal, while
the union that strikes or pickets for the very same goals is protected
from state prosecution. This can be rationalized in terms of the
Court's proper sensitivity to the constitutional importance of the
latter, but it would also seem to contradict the above mentioned
public 5policy supporting the peaceful resolution of industrial dis7
putes.
One other point made by Justice Douglas, which is certainly
dictum, should be noted. It is one thing to dismiss the argument
that Garmon is "at war" with the present holding by way of the
accurate analysis of the latter as plagued by the thicket-like impediments posed by section 14(b); but it is quite another matter and this writer believes an erroneous over statement -t to say, as
does Mr. Justice Douglas, that Garmon does not state a constitutional principle.7 6 The doctrine of preemption is one rooted in constitutional foundations. More specifically, it is the judiciary's interpretation of congressional intent to occupy a field of legislation pursuant
to their power to do so under the commerce clause and the supremacy clause. Garmon, of course, does rationalize "the problems of
coexistence between federal and state regulatory schemes" as the
Court says. But the acknowledgement of the manifold difficulties
with which the Court wrestled before finally settling for that case
as a means to achieve an orderly and intelligible rationalization does
not require a misstatement of constitutional law.77
C.

Administration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement

Unlike Wiley and Humphrey the employer-employee relationship
here has a more identifiable, though not necessarily stable form. Returning to section 301 problems, one other case in need of mention is
United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing Co.7" Mr. Jus74. Ibid. The Court cites in this regard Local 438, Constr. & Gen. Laborers Union
v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963); Local 429 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Farnsworth
& Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969 (1957).
75. See notes 2, 52 supra.
76. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
77. Ibid.
78. 376 U.S. 246 (1964).
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tice Harlan, speaking for a unanimous Court, held that a walkout,
allegedly in violation of a no-strike clause, does not repudiate the labor
contract and that, thus, the union does not necessarily waive its right to
arbitration. The arbitration clause here was a broad one,"9 thus covering the no-strike provision itself.' The Court reserved comment
on the possibility of a different conclusion if the strike involved "a
fundamental and long -lasting change in the relationship of the parties
It may be that a case
prior to the demand for arbitration .. .81
involving critical economic circumstances visited upon the employer
by such action would argue for a different holding.82
One obvious trend contained in both present cases as well as
Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. American Bakery Workers83 is their departure from the rationale of Lincoln Mills and Warrior - the
notion that the promise by the union not to strike is the quid
pro quo for the promise to arbitrate by the employer." If that
concept had been retained rather than the more realistic investigation into the parties' intent, the Court might have been compelled
to, discharge the employer from a duty to arbitrate, at least where
conduct was clearly within the ambit of the no-strike clause.85 Mr.
Justice Harlan may very well have guarded against this argument by
stating that the grievance and arbitration procedures were intended
largely, if not wholly, for the benefit of the union, and that one
would thus imagine that breach of the no-strike obligation by employees apparently without union authorization would not waive
the independent rights of the union, both parties being specifically
referred to in the no-strike clause."
In the Needham case, Mr. Justice Black did not dissent as in
Smith. One might surmise the reasons to be that: (1) the union
rather than the employees brought the action; and (2) the activity
in question was less visibly related to the exclusive jurisdiction of
79. Id. at 250.
80. Ibid.
81. Id.at 253.
82. This might be similar to the ad boc treatment of lockout cases. See especially
American Brake Shoe Co., 116 N.LR.B. 820 (1956), rev'd, 244 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.
1957); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943).
83. 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
84. Cf. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
85. The argument implicit in Warrior that the Court is without the proper expertise
is now impaired by Wiley.
86. Local 721, United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247,
250 (1964).
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the NLRB.8" But, in light of his sharp criticism in Carey, which
expressed concern with the employer's quandary in confronting a
number of tribunals and the consequent potential of being "mulcted
in damages," it is curious that a similiar comment was not registered
here. In Needham, the employer had already started a damage suit
in a state court. Might not the judge in this action have to pass
on the legal issues in the strike? What impact does this have on
arbitration? The Court acknowledged the converse hypothetical:
"[Wie find it unnecessary to decide what effect, if any, factual or
legal determinations 88of an arbritrator would have on a related
'
action in the courts.
II.

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
AS LITIGANT

A.

Secondary Boycotts

By far the most significant decision of the Court with respect to
secondary boycotts is NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers (Tree
Fruits).89 This case marks a rather surprising shift in the Court's
attitude toward picketing as free speech. Moreover, the approach
undertaken is certain to spawn progeny which will return to haunt
the Court for many years.
In Tree Fruits, the Board held that Congress, by enacting section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) 9" as a part of Landrum-Griffin in 1959, had
prohibited all secondary consumer picketing.9 The court of appeals
set aside the Board's order and remanded so that the Board could
accept evidence relating to whether in fact the secondary establishment was threatened, coerced, and restrained within the meaning of
the above mentioned provision. The court of appeals stated the
requirement as affirmative proof that the secondary employer had
87. But see Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
88. Local 721, United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247,
253 n.5 (1964).
89. 377 U.S. 58 (1964). In this regard see Note, Picketing and Publicity under Section 8(b)(4) of the LMRA, 73 YALE L.J. 1265 (1964).
90. L.M.R.A. § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B), 61 Star. 140, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4)
(ii) (B) (Supp. V, 1964); "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organi. . to threaten, coerce or restrain any person engaged in comzation or its agents -.
merce or in an industry affecting commerce, where.., an object thereof is ... forcing
or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting or otherwise
dealing in the products of any other producer, processor or manufacturer, or to cease
doing business with any other person."
91. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 132 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961); cf. Upholsterers Frame
& Bedding Workers, 132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961).
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suffered substantial economic impact or the immediate threat thereof. Otherwise, the court said, serious constitutional problems would
be raised. 2
The Court's majority opinion related the facts: Local 760 had
called a strike against fruit packers and warehousemen who sold
"Washington State" apples to some stores in the chain of Safeway
retail stores. The union instituted a consumer boycott against the
apples, and placed pickets who walked back and forth in front of
the customers' entrances at forty-six Safeway stores in Seattle. The
pickets wore placards and distributed handbills - both of which
dearly identified their dispute with the primary employer - which
appealed to the consuming public not to buy "non-union Washington
State apples." The apples were, in the words of the Court, "only
one of numerous food products sold in the store." There were
no work stoppages involving either Safeway employees or employees
of other employers; there was no interference with customer ingress and egress.
(1) Publicity-Signal Analysis.-The Court prefaced its examination of legislative history by citing NLRB v. Drivers Local
Union, 3 wherein the Court had held that minority union organizational picketing did not "coerce" and "restrain" employees within
the meaning of section 8(b) (1) (A). 9 4 The Court then stated:
Throughout the history of federal regulation of labor relations,
Congress has consistently refused to prohibit peaceful picketing
except where it is used as a means to achieve specific ends which
experience has shown are undesirable .... Both the congressional
policy and our adherence to this principle of interpretation reflect
concern that a broad ban against peaceful picketing might collide
with the guarantees of the First Amendment.9 5
Operating within this framework, the Court said that legislative
history showed that the isolated evil proscribed by Congress was
peaceful secondary consumer picketing used to persuade customers
to stop trading with the secondary employer so that he, in turn,
would cease trading with the primary employer - the firm with
which the union had its original dispute. The Court also found
that this "narrow focus" bespoke such conduct as different from
92. Fruit & Vegetable Packers v. NLRB, 308 F.2d, 311, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
93. 362 U.S. 274 (1961).
94. L.M.R.A. § 8(b) (1)(A), 61 Stat. 140,as amended,29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1)(A)
(Supp. V, 1964) : "Itshall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents - to restrain or coerce ... employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7."
95. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1963).
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"peaceful picketing at the secondary site directed only at the struck
product. In the latter case, the union's appeal to the public is confined to its dispute with the primary employer, since the public is
not asked to withhold its patronage from the secondary employer,
but only to boycott the primary employer's goods."'
With all respect to the Court's research, most observers, this writer included, have
dissented from the view that Congress has followed its "usual practice" and thus played the role of careful particularization that the
Court has assigned to it. Mr. Justice Harlan's findings, in dissent,
would seem to reflect the more accurate mood of Congress; that
secondary consumer picketing was intended to be illegal per se."
But the Court insists on its interpretation and hints darkly at the
possibility of constitutional reefs lurking up out of waters such as
those through which Justice Harlan calmly navigates.
The feared "broad ban" cannot be that of the Thornhill v. Alabama98 variety, for the legislation in Thornhill possessed breadth so
all encompassing as to create an unconstitutional vagueness. Though
this case promulgated the incorporation of picketing as an exercise of
constitutional right, First Amendment contours were not clarified. In
meeting the constitutional question here, the Court might have
taken the same line with regard to the breadth, or at least inherent
vagueness, of the words "threaten, restrain or coerce." But in this
context the troublesome legislative history would have caused even
greater embarrassment. Employment of the vagueness standard
here would require extraordinary judicial persuasiveness. And even
more important, the Thornhill approach would require that most of
the NLRA be struck down as unconstitutional. All of section 8 (a),
which is dependent on the "interference, restraint and coercion" language of section 8(a) (1), would have to go. Section 8(b) (1)
(A) would face similar difficulties. So also would section 8(c),
the free speech proviso, the guideline of which is "coercion."" Most
probably then, reference to prior free speech cases would have to
settle on AFL v. Swing,' which struck down as unconstitutional a
state statute prohibiting stranger picketing at a retail establishment.
96. Id. at 63.
97. Id. at 84-92.
98. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
99. L.M.R.A. § 8(c), 61 Stat. 140, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (Supp. V,
1964): "The expressing of any views, argument or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any provisions of this subchapter, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
100. 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
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Thus, presumably even were Congress to speafy the per se prohibition
of picketing more specifically than is done in Landrum-Griffin, the
Court, if one may rely on the hints thrown out in Tree Fruits,would
view it, or at least its application to the facts here, as an unconstitutional deprivation of free speech. If all the above is true, however,
it is nevertheless difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Court is
leading us into virgin territory that is beyond Swing principles. This
is so because: (1) the picketing activity present in Tree Fruits is
secondary in location rather than the primary activity present in
Swing; and (2) the Court in Hughes v. Superior Court '' viewed the
more analagous (than Swing) consumer boycott picketing there
as per se a "signal" to immediate action, thus making it distinguishable from a purer variety of free speech. The Court there was able
to couple the explosiveness of signal activity with an 'unlawful objective which the state legitimately sought to proscribe and thus
come up with state action inoffensive to the Constitution. Moreover, one must remember that Hughes was not even a traditional
labor-management dispute in the sense that Tree Fruits is;'" 2 ergo
it is not a context in which signal picketing is comparable to cases
like the latter.'
Thanks to the statutory construction utilized in Tree Fruits and
the theories necessary thereto, the Court is now constrained to amputate substantial portions of Hughes when it faces, as it must, the
constitutional issue. Of course, had the Court more frankly acknowledged the legislative history's true import, the way would have been
open to reevaluate the Hughes signal theory in terms of consumer
picketing.'
By declaring invalid a statutory provision which proscribed unlawful objectives (equally dear to the Court and Congress
if one takes the Swing approach rather than something else like
Thornhill) the Court would have struck at the very heart of Hughes
and, moreover, at the flimsy construction of judicially created state
policy, the poor stuff out of which the Hanke0 5 and Vogt " ' de101. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
102. Picketing in Hughes was found to be violative of California's policy against
quota hiring on a racial basis. But see New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.,
303 U.S. 552 (1937); Tanner Motor Livery Ltd., 57 L.R.R.M. 1170 (NLRB 1964).
103. Cf. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951);
IBEW v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
104. This is not to underestimate the real hurdles posed by the arguably less threatening action in Hughes and the secondary employer involvement in Tree Fruits.
105. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
106. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogr, 354 U.S. 284 (1957). Indeed Tree
Fruits would appear to go beyond the protection sought after and denied the union in
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cisions were built. But evidently a majority of the Court could not
stir itself to devise a more plausible analysis to protect customerdirected picketing as "publicity" rather than a "signal" as aimed at
employees. °7 Instead, the Court seems to concede this issue completely by stating that the employed distinction between product and
establishment picketing
is opposed as "unrealistic" because it is urged, all picketing automatically provokes the public to stay away from the picketed
establishment. The public will, it is said, neither read the signs
and handbills nor note the explicit injunction that "this is not a
strike against any store or market." Be that as it may, our holding
today simply takes note of the fact that a broad condemnation of
peaceful picketing, such as that urged upon us by petitioners,
has never been adopted by Congress, and an intention to do so
is not revealed with that "dearest indication in the legislative
history" which we require .... 108
In other words, even if the public acts in response to a signal
type picketing, or more accurately, indulges in a signal type reaction, the conduct of this saving operation made on behalf of
constitutional enactments could not be altered. Thus, the picket
sign inscribed with good intentions, but which produces immediate
action similar to the impact which the Court has previously enjoined, when aimed at secondary employees and primary consumers,
would appear just as firmly anchored to the calm harbor of the Constitution.
The answer to all of this is that the Court may be said to have
avoided judgments about whether consumer response to the picket
signs as such is one of reasoned reflection or whether this signal
produces a more harmful or destructive - from Congress' viewpoint - emotional reaction. It might be said that the above quoted
remarks relate solely to consumer attentiveness and literacy, and
leave the Court free to draw back, without contradicting itself, and
uphold and strike down congressional legislation on the basis of its
applicability to publicity or signal picketing. But this writer submits that a broader conclusion is unavoidable. Consumer reaction
of course does not change the constitutional considerations present
here, at least when the pickets demonstrate a proper intent. Moreover, the Court rejects the court of appeals' economic loss test. It
both Hanke and Vogt. In the former the union causes the same approximate effect
or injury present in Hanke and Vogt and at the secondary rather than primary sims.
107. See the excellent analysis in this regard contained in Cox, Strikes, Picketing and
the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574 (1951).
108. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 71 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
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is quite conceivable that Justice Brennan misunderstood this test as
set forth by the District of Columbia Circuit, for in the sentence
following its rejection this comment appears: "A violation of
8 (b) (4) (ii) (B) would not be established, merely because respondents' picketing was effective to reduce Safeway's sales of Washingled, or might lead Safeway to drop
ton State apples, even if10 this
9
the item as a poor seller.'
Thus, sensibly, a successful effort does not make unlawful that
which must be lawful according to the Court's first premise. Economic ruination for the secondary employer, insofar as the primary
product is concerned, is irrelevant." ° But the District of Columbia
Circuit would appear to have been interested in economic injury to
the entire establishment, and not the single product, as Justice Brennan assumes, so as to perhaps gather evidence ascertaining whether
in fact the impact is primary (lawful) or secondary (unlawful). In
short, this approach would determine whether the picketing, regardless of the words used, produced signal emotional responses from
the public; it is admitted, however, that the garnering of such evidence would be difficult. The Supreme Court's Tree Fruits analysis will not permit such investigation, at least in cases where the
union obtains good enough counsel to give them the right words to
use on their placards. But pursuant to, this approach, picketing
which is not so dear may run afoul of the law - the audience aimed
for would seem to be irrelevant if the Court is to be logically consistent with its Tree Fruits holding.
Nothing in Mr. Justice Brennan's "publicity - signal" concession
need have been particularly unfortunate were it not for the simultaneous movement which, when viewed in connection with the
above, acquires characteristics resembling encirclement of the foe,
in this case, unmentioned prior constitutional decisions. Although
recently reaffirming its previous views on picketing as free speech,"'
and thus perhaps limiting the meaning of Tree Fruits as a less combustible expression situated at a remote secondary situs, the Court,
for the first time since the immediate post-Thornhill days, appears
willing to tell Congress and, necessarily, the states that they have
gone too far in their substantive legislation concerning unlawful
109. Id. at 72-73.
110.
truly
Both
111.

However, the Court has countered the argument that this is likely to occur, thus
threatening, coercing and restraining some employers in some real hypotheticals.
the Court's argument and hypotheticals are discussed below.
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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objectives. Ever since Swing and Cafeteria Employees v. Angelos,112
the Court, under the steady rein of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, has
countenanced the most sweeping restrictions against peaceful picketing."' While it is good that that trend may now be destined for
an abrupt termination, it is somewhat regrettable that the pertinent
and useful dichotomy of publicity and signal picketing was given
away to advance a questionable statutory construction that detracts
from the Court's prestige as judges standing above legislation. Those
prior constitutional decisions now have allies whose motives vary.
The first might be classified as the "statutory constructionists" who
will both point angrily at the contrary impact of legislative history,
as well as bemoan the consequent surrender of constitutional analysis. The second are the "constitutionalists": some of them may
protest the double sided squeeze of disregard for the publicity-signal
analysis on the one hand, and the encroachment on Congress' substantive regulation on the other.
(2)
Economic Injury Test.-What kind of future does this
statutory construction bode for the NLRB and the courts? As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court did not allow the possibility
of severe economic injury relating to the primary product or actual
disruption of that business relationship to alter its holding. While
conceding the possibility that customers would not read the placards,
the Court seemed concerned to point up the small likelihood that
a secondary employer, perhaps having been stung by the contention
that their distinction is "unrealistic," could realistically be "threatened, restrained or coerced" where the placards are advertised within
the rules of the game. The Court's prophecy - or could the idea
have been derived from experience - was that the following results
would proceed from the two types of picketing:
When consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers
not to buy the struck product, the union's appeal is closely confined to the primary dispute. The site of the appeal is expanded
to include the premises of the secondary employer, but if the appeal succeeds, the secondary employers' purchases from the struck
firm are decreased only because the public has diminished its purchase of the struck product. On the other hand, when consumer
picketing is employed to persuade customers not to trade at all

with the secondary employer, the latter stops buying the struck
product, not because of falling demand, but in response to pressure
112. 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
113. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Hughes
v. Superior Ct., 339 U.S. 460 (1950); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339

U.S. 470 (1950); cf. Building Service Employees Local 262 v. Gazzom, 339 U.S. 532
(1950).
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designed to inflict injury on his business generally. In such case,
the union does more than merely follow the struck product; it
creates a separate dispute with the secondary employer.114

In a footnote, the Court poses an example of what is meant by the
above language. The Court says that if a public appeal directed only
at the product results in a 25 per cent decline of sales of that product,
"the corresponding reduction of his purchases of the product is due
to his inability to sell any more.""'
But with a union appeal broadened to seek public cessation of all patronage and the same 25 per
cent response, "the secondary employer faces this decision: whether
to discontinue handling the primary product entirely, even though
he might otherwise have continued to sell it at the 75 per cent level,
in order to prevent the loss of sales on other products."'
One's first reaction is astonishment. The Court frames the
product picketing example in terms of mere falling demand similar
to the economic phenomena of the business cycle; such circumstances seem to be described as almost beyond control or influence
by immediate parties such as the union. Only the customer decides.
More important, the Court balks at envisaging a cessation of business between secondary and primary employers, although as stated
before the Court later refers to this possibility and brushes aside any
suggestion of illegality. But if the placards and handbills contain
language which lacks sufficient identification of the primary dispute, an entirely different result will ensue. Here it is said that the
secondary employer "stops buying the struck product," though in
the footnote the opinion is flexible enough to allow that the employer "faces a decision." Is the Court here attempting to employ
the same economic injury test which it rejected, although perhaps
mistaken as to its theory, of the District of Columbia Circuit? Not
entirely, it would seem, in light of the above mentioned statement
that customers may act contrary to the signs' instructions. But it
is possible that economic injury to nonprimary products would be
relevant where ambiguous or hazy language makes it difficult for
the Board to discover the unions' intent."'1 An actual boycott of nonprimary products might expose intentions and help resolve the
case." 8 Perhaps consumer testimony as to what he thought the
114. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 72 (1964).
115. Id. at 72 n.20.
116. Ibid.
117. See Coca Cola Bottling Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (1965).
118. Presumably if this approach were followed, the union could submit evidence
showing that losses due to primary goods were disproportionatelygreater than others.
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pickets meant and whether he was "coerced" would be important
here. But would lack of coercion turn this case in favor of the
union? Does this come dangerously close to an "inconvenience to
the owner" test?".. Here also it is possible that constitutional
questions would be presented in which an abandonment of the
publicity-signal analysis would produce regret. In any event we
may well expect some approach by the Court itself which varies
from Tree Fruits, for it disagrees, "for the purpose of this case,"
with the economic loss test.
It should be remembered that secondary consumer-directed picketing could take place within many different factual contexts. Some
of them may impose great strains on the Tree Fruits analysis.' 20
The dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan gives one of the most obvious
examples. This is the case of the retailer largely or entirely dependent upon the sales of the struck product. The Court is more
persuasive in dealing with a retailer like Safeway with many products
when it says that product picketing does not "threaten, coerce or
restrain." But what of the independent gas station owner, to take
Mr. Justice Harlan's example, who buys from one company; or what
of retailers with exclusive franchises, such as automobile dealers?
Suppose that the retailer is dependent upon three or four products.
How is the line - if it indeed exists - to be drawn? The Court must
strain logic in these cases to find no violation, or else it must
declare this provision unconstitutional as applied in a piecemeal
fashion. Is either course a satisfactory one?
What of consumer picketing against suppliers and distributees
who do not deal regularly with the public? What is the effect of
Tree Fruits on a merchant who deals with the public and is picketed
for advertising in a newspaper with which the union has a primary
dispute?' 2 ' The analysis does not fit these cases, but since the
119. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940).
120. An example of such strains is contained in NLRB v. Upholsterers Frame &
Bedding Workers, 331 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1964). In that case the Eighth Circuit,
with little discussion, applied Tree Fruits in support of a complaint dismissal when the
union simply wished to channel manufacturing agreements with the picketed retailer
to local employers. There was no specific primary employer to be identified and the
placards requested consumers to "patronize home industry." It would seem that this
indicates an intended boycott of total, rather than selective proportions and would thus
fall beyond Tree Fruits rationale's protection. But the Court held that that case was
"controlling here" and "dispositive." Id. at 564.
121. See Local 154, Int'l Typographical Union, 135 N.L.R.B. 991 (1962). See also
the recently decided Glazers' Union, 57 L.R.R.M. 1210 (NLRB 1964), wherein the
Board rejected the claim that secondary picketing was informational and relied, in
part, upon the difficulties involved in ascertaining a public response to picketing at a
construction site.
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wording on picket signs is of primary importance it might be difficult for the Court to sanction injunctions against such conduct.
(3) Identifying the PrimaryDispute.-Another question here
is how dearly must the primary dispute be identified. Paradoxically, it would seem that statutory construction would argue for strict
standards, but the Court's desire to avoid constitutional questions
requires laxity. Do the words "do not patronize" imply a total
boycott of the secondary establishment and thus convert picketing
which is otherwise lawful into unlawful activity? 2 2 This is not to
deprecate an approach which places a premium on reasoning and
intelligence (publicity) rather than emotions (signal). On the
contrary, the high value which the first amendment places on the
communication of ideas is well reflected in the former and, moreover, in the goals which the Court sets for itself in Tree Fruits. This
writer's basic quarrel with that decision goes to the means established for implementation; in short, the focus on the picket sign
rather than on the audience to which the appeal is addressed. The
writer does not view the former as entirely irrelevant or unimportant.
Indeed, in the writer's opinion, the sign which is without words or
identification from which the viewer may possibly extract ideas and
opinions is an albatross, uninvited and unsuited to the Holmesian
market place of ideas, and as such is not entitled to the same protection. But it is this writer's fear that the Court, by disregarding effect,
will come to quibble excessively and wastefully with cause. The latter's pertinency should be, as described above, a rule for what is hopefully a near fringe of worthlessness. It seems to this writer that the
audience is of primary importance. The courts must evaluate, on
the best information available, the reactions of customers as distinguished from, for instance, skilled craftsmen, subject to severe
internal union discipline, when confronting picket lines. Certainty
and more clearly defined guidelines are not the least of the benefits
to be derived from this approach.
(4) Unlawful Objective Test.-It is this writer's opinion that
Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers12 3 was the best position to take. His concurring opinion
concludes, like Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent, that Congress meant to
outlaw secondary product picketing; but unlike the dissent, Mr. Justice Black contends that the provision abridges speech and press in
violation of the first amendment. The concurrence states that the
122.
123.

See note 117 supra.
377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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provision in question is not to keep public order or safety, but rather
"it is difficult to see.. . [how it] intends to do anything but prevent dissemination of information about the facts of a labor dispute
a right protected by the First Amendment."' 24 Thus, the conclusion is that a statute proscribing the particular views of one side
of a certain kind of labor dispute "rather than all picketing for
public order" is bad. This would appear to constitute the heart of
the rationale. However, Mr. Justice Black recognizes the existence
of other and what this writer believes to be more important obstacles
to his conclusion.
In 1949, Mr. Justice Black wrote the Court's opinion in Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co." There it was held that picketing
for the purpose of obtaining agreements in violation of Missouri's
anti-trust law, for which there were criminal sanctions, could be enjoined. Mr. Justice Black rejected the contention that the first amendment's protection extended to "an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute."' 2 6 It is interesting to note that the
Tree Fruits concurrence characterizes the unlawful objective in
Giboney as "an unlawful or criminal undertaking."'2 7 It is difficult
to discover the unstated emphasis given to this, but as the Court has
held in the preemption cases, 2 ' the form that a statute assumes, be it
criminal, tort or administrative, cannot impinge upon constitutional
considerations.
The crux of Giboney was the union's activities, "their powerful
transportation combination, their patrolling, their formation of a
picket line warning union men not to cross it at peril of their union
membership, their publicizing . . . ." all of which joined together
to constitute substantive matter within legislative reach. Mr. Justice
Black was able to distinguish Giboney on this point because the
objective was prohibited; the publicity proviso specifically protects
activity other than picketing to accomplish the same ends. This is
an interesting argument, and although it could be applied to all
secondary boycott law so long as any loophole existed, the presence
of congressional affirmation lends it some plausibility. But this
writer does not think that the latter provides enough of a distinc124. Id. at 78.
125. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
126. Id. at 498.
127. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 79 (1964). It cannot be said
that Justice Black necessarily relies on or cites Giboney within this context as the word
preceding its citation is "compare."
128. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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tion from the former to be convincing. Of course, Mr. Justice Black
is wise to say that the test should be unlawful objectives and to thus, as
a consequence, ignore Hanke and Vogt where such were non-existent.
The majority's requirement of "specific ends" probably dooms those
cases; but like the majority, Mr. Justice Black avoids the unavoidable.
Here, the secondary consumer picketing is prohibited, and with
all deference to the Justice, the consummation of an agreement formalizing the union's objective in this very case would have been unlawful.12 The unavoidable question is how far may Congress go in
regulating picketing? The answer given by Mr. Justice Black is the
right one: not as far as section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) extends.
(5)
Construction of Sections 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii).-Mr.Justice
Brennan was not plagued with criticism in writing the opinion in
NLRB v. Servette, Inc.,'3 for there were no concurring or dissenting opinions. In Servette, the Court interpreted more of the new
Landrum-Griffin amendments and held that certain managers were
"individuals" so as to make unlawful under certain circumstances
inducement of them by trade unionists to cease business with a
primary employer.'
Respondent Servette, a wholesaler of specialty
food merchandise, alleged that the union had induced and encouraged supermarket managers to stop handling Servette merchandise and that therefore a violation of subsection (i) of section
8(b) (4) had been committed. 3 ' The Board held that the managers were not "individuals" such as the subsection contemplates
and thus found no violation. 3 ' The Ninth Circuit reversed on
this point."' The Supreme Court agreed with the Board's result
to the effect that subsection (i) could not apply to the inducements
in question aimed at management decisions. Thus, it was held that
while the union could well violate subsection (i) in regard to
supermarket managers if it appealed to them to "down tools" in a
129. See LM.R.A. § 8(e), 61 Stat. 140, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. V,
1964).
130. 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
131. Id. at 50-54. A discussion of the legislative history is contained therein.
132. LM.R.A. 5 8(b) (4) (i), 61 Star. 140, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4):
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents... to engage
in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the
course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle
or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services ......

where the objective is that of an unlawful secondary boycott.

133. Servette, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 1501 (1961).
134. Servette, Inc. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 377 U.S. 46
(1964).
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rank and file fashion; such was not the case in Servette. The Court
put it this way:
The careful creation of separate standards differentiating the treatment of appeals to the employees of the secondary employer not to
perform their employment services, from appeals for other ends
which are attended by threats, coercion or restraint, argues conclusively against the interpretation of subsection (i) as reaching
the Local's appeals to the supermarket managers in this case. If
subsection (i), in addition to prohibiting inducement of employees to withhold employment services, also reaches an appeal
that the managers exercise their delegated authority by making a
business judgment to cease dealing with the primary employer,
subsection (ii) would be almost superfluous. Harmony between
(i) and (ii) is best achieved by construing subsection (i) to
prohibit inducement of the managers to withhold their services
from their employer, and subsection (ii) to condemn an attempt
to induce the exercise of discretion only if 135
the inducement would
"threaten, coerce, or restrain" that exercise.
It should be noted that the Court's approach is at slight variance
with the position of the Board. The Board's rule created an irrebutable presumption that supervisors would not react like employees
to union appeals. The Court, on the other hand, adopts a "wait and
see" attitude. The Board is wrong, says the Court, in holding that
supervisors cannot be individuals within the meaning of subsection
(i). This would seem to make the union's intentions, and perhaps
the manager's reaction, paramount. Even though a manager might
normally speak and act in the employer's interest - and thus usually come within the applicable subsection (ii) - an appeal to act
as an employee violates subsection (i). Presumably, the latter would
encompass work stoppages, slow downs, and simple encouragement
to harass. The union does not take the manager as it finds him.
The Court also held that wholesale distributors were to be
viewed as "producers" (thus protecting union handbilling) within
the meaning of the publicity proviso,"' and that a warning to distribute handbills in front of the non-cooperating stores of secondary
employers could not constitute "threats" under subsection (ii) : "The
statutory protection for the distribution of handbills would be undermined if a threat to engage in protected conduct were not itself
'
protected."137
135. NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 54 (1964).
136. L.M.R.A. § 8(b) (4), 61 Star. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158
(b) (4): "nothing contained in such paragraph (4) shall be construed to prohibit
publicity, other than picketing.
... Qualifications on this right are truthfulness and
a failure to induce work stoppages.
137. NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 57 (1964).
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With regard to the first holding, the Court indicates, though it
does not expressly state, that its interpretation of a "producer" is
even broader than the facts in Servette require. The Court notes
with approval the Board's holding in Lohman Sales Co.'3 8 to the
effect that a wholesaler comes within the definition. But Lohman
enunciated a doctrine much more wide sweeping. In that case the
Board held that the word "producer" as used in the proviso encompasses anyone who enhances the economic value of the product
ultimately sold or consumed and thus that no distinction need be
drawn between processors, distributors, and suppliers of services. A
wholesaler might be said to be more closely related to actual production, thus placing such an employer in a distinct classification in
relation to other employers with whom the "producer" nexus does
not tie so tightly.
But the Court would appear to acquiesce in the Board interpretation for two reasons. The first and more persuasive reason is the
Court's comment that legislative history does not suggest a narrower
protection in the proviso than that set forth in the prohibitions of
section 8(b) (4) to which the proviso is an exception. The second
consists of disagreement expressed with the Ninth Circuit's ruling
in Great W. Broadcasting Co. v. NLRB,'3 9 to the effect that a television station was not a "producer." Although this was not stated,
the Court's broad interpretation was probably necessary to avoid
serious constitutional questions in regard to publicity at and away
from the secondary employer's situs. Fewer of the hurdles erected,
by picketing to first amendment protection are found here.14 This
is especially true of the more traditional and supposedly less emotional forums like newspapers, radio, and television.
(6) Separate Gate Picketing.-Mr. Justice White delivered
the opinion of the Court in United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 4 ' another secondary boycott case. Here, the union picketed a special
entrance used only by railroad personnel, the entrance being adjacent to the primary employer's struck plant. The property upon
which the picketing took place was owned by the railroad rather
than the primary employer. The question before the Court was
whether the picketing violated sections 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii). The
138.
139.
140.
141.

Lohmon Sales Co., 132 N.LR.B. 901 (1961).
310 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1962).
Cf. Bakery Drivers, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
376 U.S. 492 (1964).
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Board held'42 that the picketing was primary activity under the
Court's previous decision in Local 761, IUE v. NLRB (General
Electric)."3 The Second Circuit reversed.'
In the General Electric case, the Court had held that separate
gate picketing at gates used exclusively by secondary employees at
the primary situs was primary and lawful if the work done by such
employees was connected with the normal operations of the primary
employer; it was secondary and unlawful if unrelated to the day-today operations. Here, General Electric was viewed as dispositive.
The Court stated:
We think General Electric's construction of the proviso § 8(b)
(4) (B) (protecting primary activity) is sound and we will not
disturb it. The primary strike, which is protected by the proviso,
is aimed at applying economic pressure by halting the day-to-day
operations of the struck employer. But Congress not only preserved the right to strike; it also saved "primary picketing" from
the secondary ban. Picketing has traditionally been a major
weapon to implement the goals of a strike and has characteristically
been aimed at all those approaching the situs whose mission is selling, delivering or otherwise contriluting to the operations which
the strike is endeavoring to halt. In light of this traditional goal
of primary pressures we think Congress intended to preserve the
right to picket during a strike a gate reserved for employees of
neutral delivery men furnishing
day-to-day service essential to the
145
plant's regular operations.
There are, however, difficulties with the Court's treatment of
this case. In General Electric, it was said that "if a separate gate
were devised for regular plant deliveries, the barring of picketing
at that location would make a clear invasion on traditional primary
activity of appealing to neutral employees whose tasks aid the employer's everyday operations."' 46 Here, the separate gate and picketing were somewhat more remote from the primary situs; this difference is significant. Location, though important to the General
Electric rationale, was not decisive. Picketing here was so proximate
and related to the employer's day-to-day operations that property
ownership considerations could not operate to convert this into unlawful activity. The Steelworkers ruling liberally expands the General Electric situs so as to reach even those approaching the situs.
142.

Carrier Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 127 (1961).

143. 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
144. Carrier Corp. v.NLRB, 311 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 492
(1964).
145. United Steelworkers v.NLRB,376 U.S. 492, 498-99 (1964).
146. Local 761, IUE v.NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 681 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
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Accordingly, the Court seems to rely equally upon location and the
nature of the work. Thus, the key here is not, contrary to what was
said in General Electric, the nature of the work performed by the
secondary employer. The importance of such hedging on rationale
is dramatized by the Court's all-inclusive application of the nature
of the work concept to separate gate suppliers. For the Court, it
is to be recalled, picketing is primary when "aimed at all those approaching the situs whose mission is selling, delivering or otherwise
contributing to the operations which the strike is endeavoring to
, 1 47
halt.
In General Electric, the Court apparently sought to distinguish
construction on new buildings as capital improvement for which
the primary employees did not have necessary skill or manpower
(unrelated), from routine maintenance work subcontracted because
of economic considerations (related). With regard to the latter,
it was noted that primary unit employees had performed such work
on occasion. This maintenance was what was necessary to the normal operation of the plant and consequently was considered primary.
This analysis poses problems quite similar to those confronting
the Board under section 8 (e), the proscription of unlawful objectives which the union seeks through section 8(b) (4). 148 Harmony
between the two sections is desirable and, to some degree, seems to
have been intended by Congress. 14 9 But neither General Electric
nor other decisions handed down to date provide clear guidelines for
a primary-secondary dichotomy on the basis of the work's nature.
If the actual work performed by the secondary employees must
have been done in the past in the Court's reference to past performance of maintenance work in General Electric, then the answer
must be in the affirmative. But the Board's approach in section
8(e) cases as most recently articulated in the Wilson & Co.' ° ad147. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492, 499 (1964).
148. L.M.R.A. § 8, 61 Star. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp.
V, 1964):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement express or implied, whereby
such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling,
using, selling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in any of the products of
any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and
any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing
such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and yoid ....
149. Cardinal Industries, Inc., 136 N.L.RB. 977, 987 (1962), modified, 335 F.2d
709 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
150. 143 N.LR.B. 1221 (1963), modified, 335 F.2d 709 (D.C. Cir. 1964). But
see United Artists Theatre, Inc., 4 CCH LAB. L REP. 5 13,418 (NLRB 1964).
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monition against contractual work "recapture" by primary employees is more cautious. However, the General Electric approach,
if it can be called such, would seem to comply somewhat with
the "ally" doctrine which views pressure directed at farmed out
work by the struck employer as primary activity."' But there are
other variants on this theme. Suppose that primary employees have
only the skills, experience, and manpower, but not past performance. Might not this picketing be lawful? The first three requisites
are what the Court thought the unit employees did not possess in
regard to the construction work in General Electric. But what if
more manpower is needed? What if technogical advances alter
the skills, but not the content of the job function? The answer
given by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, within the
context of section 8 (e), is that work is "fairly claimable" when the
primary employees have requsite skills and experience. 15 2 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's General Electric opinion does not
clarify what its standard is to be; and whether the factor of location
requires a more expansive interpretation than that given by the
Board in Wilson & Co. or by the "ally" doctrine.'5 3
The Steelworkers case did not afford a feasible opportunity to
open up this problem for discussion. The various criteria have no
rational application to the facts of that case. One cannot imagine
the case being decided on the basis of whether railroad work was
5
traditionally performed or fairly claimable by unit employees.1 1
Moreover, the happenstance of the delivery method - boat, truck,
railroad, etc. - is unsatisfactory for purposes of this analysis. The
crucial question is really the arriving product and its relationship
to the integrity of the employer's operations. In this manner, the
criterion employed in the General Electric case takes on a new and
different costume in the Steelworkers case.
In a sense, of course, the maintenance work in General Electric
and the coal delivered in Steelworkers are conceptually identical.
This is because the loss of each seriously damages the employer's
151. Douds v. Metropolitan Fed. of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
NLRB v. Business Mach. Mechanics Union, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 962 (1956).
152. Meat Drivers, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 709 (D.C. Cit. 1964)
(Wilson & Co.).
153. In regard to the importance of location see the varying approaches taken in
Plauche Elec., Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 250 (1962); Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works,
Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953), order affirmed, 220 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
154. Cf. Local 282, Int'l Bro. of Teamsters, 139 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1962); Milkwagon
Drivers Union, 1963 CCH NLRB DEC. 5 12,785.
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ability to conduct his primary operation. But Steelworkers particularly - with its indiscriminate categorization of all related work
must fall upon the proximate location of the separate gate as
an important factor."' Otherwise little would remain of the secondary prohibitions contained in section 8 (b) (4).
B.

Representation Elections

(1) Pre-election Employer Benefits.-NLRB v. Exchange
Parts Co.3n presents issues which are considerably simpler than
the tortuous web through which Congress bids us crawl in the area
of secondary boycotts. Regardless of one's convictions, it would
seem that there is too much law of secondary boycotts and that it is
too complicated. In the Exchange Partscase, the union advised the
employer that it was conducting an organizational campaign and
that a majority of the workers had designated the union as their
bargaining representative. The union petitioned the Board for a
representation election, which was subsequently conducted about
five months later. During two meetings before the union approached the employer, management officials announced that the
employees' "floating holiday" would come due in six weeks and
that there would be an additional floating holiday during the following year. Shortly after the Board's election order, the employer
held a dinner for the employees at which they were asked to vote
on whether the extra day of vacation would be a floating holiday or
take place on their birthdays. At the dinner, the company vicepresident referred to the forthcoming election: he stated that the
employees would be giving up their right to speak and act for
themselves if they voted union; he accused the union of distortions;
he pointed to the benefits that the employees had received without
a union, and finally he urged all employees to vote. Two weeks
before the election, all employees received a letter from the company
which emphasized that only the company could produce benefits
for the work force - not the union. Moreover, the letter contained
a detailed statement of benefits which employees had received over
a period of eleven years, a new system of computing overtime, and
a new vacation schedule.
In Exchange Parts, the Court held that pre-election employer
benefits immediately favorable to employee interests, as well as
threats and promises conditioned upon a vote against the union,
155.
156.

Cf. NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
375 U.S. 405 (1964).
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could impinge on employee free choice in the selection of their
bargaining representative. Citing Medo Photo Supply Corp. v.
NLRB' 57 wherein it was held that threats or favors to individuals
could unlawfully induce employee choice of the bargaining representative, the Court extended as "fully applicable" the principle in
that case where the union was already bargaining agent to the case
at hand. Referring in a footnote to the company's veiled threat
not to bargain with the union for new benefits if it won, the Court
stated:
The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not likely
to miss the inference that the source of benefits now conferred
is also the source from which future benefits must flow and which
may dry up if it is not obliged. The danger may be diminished
if, as in this case, the benefits are conferred permanently and unconditionally. But the absence of conditions or threats pertaining
to the particular benefits conferred would be of controlling significance only if it could be presumed that no question of additional
benefits or renegotiation of existing benefits would arise
158 in the
future; and, of course, no such presumption is tenable.
This is one of those concepts which is basic to the administration
of the NLRA, but at the same time difficult for the public to comprehend. It seems curious, the argument goes, to make unlawful
those benefits which an employer generously bestows on his workers. But Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, succinctly dealt
with this objection in the following language: "The beneficence of
an employer is likely to be emphemeral if prompted by a threat of
unionization which is subsequently removed. Insulating the right
of collective organization from calculated good will of this sort deprives employees of little that has lasting value."1 9 More precisely,
the goals of collective bargaining and employee free choice - both
of which the Board is mandated by Congress to pursue - cannot
prosper where the above employer conduct goes unchecked.
(2)
Review of Board Orders in Certification Proceedings.Finally, in Boire v. Greyhound Corp.," ' a unanimous Court resolved
an extremely significant representation case in favor of the Board.
In this case, the union filed a representation petition with the Board
pursuant to section 9(c) 1.6 requesting an election among the por157.
158.
159.

321 U.S. 678 (1944); cf. J.I.Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1964).
Id. at 410.

160. 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
161.
See L.M.R.A. § 9(c), 61 Star. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
(Supp. V, 1964).
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ters, janitors, and maids working at four terminals operated by the
employer. The amended petition designated the employer of the
workers for whom representation was sought as the Greyhound
Corporation and Floors Incorporated. The latter was a corporation
engaged in the business of providing cleaning, maintenance, and
similar services and had contracted with Greyhound for such services at the four terminals in question. The Board found that the
two were joint employers because of the common control that they
exercised over the employees.
Before the election, Greyhound filed suit in a federal district court
to enjoin the Board from carrying out the election. The district
court, relying on Leedom v.Kyne, 62 found that the Board's conclusions as to who was the employer of the service staff to be insufficient as a matter of law and set the election aside. The case
came to the Supreme Court after circuit court affirmance.
At the outset, the Court noted that the general rule makes most
Board representation final orders not directly reviewable in the
courts. " s In the light of legislative history, the Boire opinion was
able to find only two exceptions to that rule. The first was Leedom
v.Kyne in which the Board acted in excess of its statutory powers by approving a unit of professional and non-professional employees without a vote by the former - a statutory obligation under
the act. In the Leedom case, (and Mr. Justice Stewart seemed to
agree with that case in Boire) Board action was reviewable because
the order was in excess of delegated power. The second exception
arose, said the Court, where the Board was operating in the area
of "public questions particularly high in the scale of our national
But the
interest because of their international complexion.""'
Court could not find either exception present in Boire as this case
provided essentially a factual issue. "The Kyne exception is a narrow one, not to be extended to permit plenary District Court review
of Board orders in certification proceedings whenever it can be said
that an erroneous assessment of the particular facts before the Board
has led it to a conclusion which does not comport with the
Suffice it to say that the Board's election machinery
law . . . .""
would have been severely frustrated if the parties were continually
162. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
163. See L.M.R.A. §§ 159, 160, 61 Star. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §
159(c) (3) (Supp. V, 1964).
164. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 480 (1964), citing McCulloch v.
Sociedad Naional, 372 U.S. 10, 17 (1963).
165. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., supra note 164, at 481.
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free to seek injunctions whenever a Board holding on such questions which require a speedy determination did not suit their taste.
Though it assuredly can never clarify the sometimes arbitrary lines
drawn between law and fact, Boire is a good decision and it works
to the advantage of a well functioning National Labor Relations
Act.
III.

CONCLUSION

The October 1963 Term was one in which the Court made a
number of cautious resolutions without penetrating too deeply into
the realm of controversy. In some instances, such as the Tree
Fruits case, the luxury of this approach may have cost the Court
and cut down its ability to rationalize future cases intelligentlymoreover, it may have impaired some of the prestige which an independent judiciary must savor. But for every critic who complains
of unnecessary reticence there will be one who points out the error
of overstatement. One does not surrender the critical exercise in
acknowledging that the Court cannot play specialist in this or any
other field.'6 6 Indeed, this situation is, as it should be, the most
acceptable to the citizenry at large.
But there will be other terms' 67 where this seemingly endless
flow of unanswered labor questions will demand of the Court a
more definitive and exacting burden. The Court's future guidelines for this yet youthful body of case law is a dominant theme in
our country's propensity for economic growth and in the values
which we would retain as free men.
166.
167.

See LEwis, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
See 57 Analysis L.R.R.M. 17 (1964).

